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                       OPINION OF THE COURT 
  
                            ----------  
  
GARTH, Circuit Judge:  
 
 The Bankruptcy Code in § 506(c) provides that a secured 
creditor may be charged for expenses incurred by another in 
preserving or disposing of the secured property.  11 U.S.C. 
§ 506(c).  The question that is presented on this appeal and 
which we must answer is: "Does 11 U.S.C. § 506(c) authorize 
payment to trade creditors who furnish raw materials to a Chapter 
11 debtor thereby maintaining the debtor's operation, where the 
materials supplied did not directly benefit the secured 
creditor's property?"  Our answer to that question is "no" -- 
§ 506(c) does not extend to such a circumstance. 
 
 I. 
 Visual Industries Inc. and Stacor Corporation 
(collectively, "Visual") were manufacturers of office furniture. 
In the course of its operation, Visual purchased cut steel from 
plaintiff-appellant Precision Steel Shearing, Inc. 
 On August 14, 1992, (the "petition date"), Visual filed 
a voluntary petition with the bankruptcy court in the District of 
New Jersey pursuant to Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.1 
 Defendant-appellee Fremont Financial Corporation was 
Visual's primary pre-petition secured creditor and held extensive 
security interests in Visual's assets, including liens on, inter 
alia, inventory, raw materials, machinery, equipment, furniture, 
fixtures, instruments, chattel paper, general intangibles, other 
personalty, and the products and proceeds of all of the 
foregoing.  App. 241.  As of the petition date, Visual was 
indebted to Fremont in the amount of $1,946,605.90 plus costs, 
expenses and attorneys' fees. 
 In addition to Fremont's pre-petition security 
interest, on August 31, 1992, the bankruptcy court entered an 
"Amended Consent Order Authorizing the Temporary Use of Cash 
Collateral and Approving Post-Petition Financing" (the "Financing 
Order") granting Fremont "cash collateral" in, and liens on, 
essentially all of Visual's personalty and proceeds.2  The Order 
also permitted Visual to make continued use of Fremont's pre-
                     
1
.   On August 20, 1992 the Bankruptcy Court entered an order 
authorizing the joint administration of these cases pursuant to 
Fed. R. Bankr. 1015. 
2
.   The Bankruptcy Code, as amended in 1994, defines cash 
collateral in relevant part as "cash, negotiable instruments, 
documents of title, securities, deposit accounts, or other cash 
equivalents whenever acquired in which the estate and an entity 
other than the estate have an interest and includes the proceeds, 
products, offspring, rents, or profits of property subject to a 
security interest . . . whether existing before or after the 
commencement of a case under this title."  11 U.S.C. § 363(a). 
petition cash collateral and provided for additional post-
petition financing of Visual's operations by Fremont.  App. 247.3 
 Fremont's post-petition financing enabled Visual to 
continue in operation for almost a year, during which time it 
produced sufficient revenues to reduce its obligations to Fremont 
by roughly $900,000 to $1,004,740. 
 During this time Precision continued to supply cut 
steel to Visual.  Precision and Visual arranged a payment system 
whereby Precision would ship the steel to Visual upon receipt of 
a telefax copy of a check to be sent by overnight mail.  The 
checks were post-dated and made payable forty-five to sixty days 
after the shipment had been made.  No order of the bankruptcy 
court either authorized or directed such an arrangement. 
                     
3
.   In addition to the other protections afforded Fremont's 
interests, the Financing Order specified that Fremont's secured 
claim would be treated as an allowed administrative expense claim 
with priority over, inter alia, "administrative expenses of the 
kind specified in or ordered pursuant to Section[]. . . 506(c) 
. . . of the Code," App. 179, and further provided that: 
 Anything to the contrary notwithstanding, any 
and all costs and expenses of the 
preservation and/or disposition of assets of 
the Debtors against which [Fremont] holds 
liens or mortgage, or which are otherwise 
chargeable to Fremont pursuant to Section 
506(c) of the Code, shall not be chargeable 
to and/or against Fremont by any person or 
governmental unit. 
App. 180-181.  Fremont in part relies on these references to 
§ 506(c) to support its argument that no claim under § 506(c) can 
be made.  Precision points out that it was not a party to the 
Order and hence is not precluded from making the present § 506(c) 
claim.   
 We do not rely on this provision of the Order in our 
disposition of this appeal. 
 Visual's checks began to be returned for insufficient 
funds in June of 1993, and shortly thereafter Visual ceased 
business, owing Precision $94,414.90 for post-petition steel 
deliveries.  On September 7, 1993, Visual's Chapter 11 
reorganization was converted into a Chapter 7 liquidation 
proceeding. 
 On May 10, 1994, Precision filed a motion with the 
bankruptcy court pursuant to § 506(c) of the Code seeking to 
compel payment of unpaid post-petition cut steel invoices by 
surcharging Fremont's collateral.  The bankruptcy court denied 
Precision's motion on June 20, 1994, on the ground that under 
§ 506(c) Precision's furnishing of cut steel to Visual did not 
directly benefit the property securing Fremont's loan to Visual. 
 Precision appealed to the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey, which affirmed the decision of 
the bankruptcy court on September 26, 1994.  The District Court 
recognized that a direct or express benefit to the secured 
creditor had to be shown, and agreed with the bankruptcy court 
that the sales of raw material to Visual did not operate to 
directly preserve or dispose of Fremont's collateral.  Hence, the 
District Court affirmed the bankruptcy court's decision.  This 
appeal followed.  Our jurisdiction rests on 28 U.S.C. § 158(d).  
We affirm. 
  II. 
 This Court's standard of review is clearly erroneous as 
to findings of fact by the bankruptcy court, and plenary as to 
conclusions of law.  In re Stendardo, 991 F.2d 1089, 1094 (3d 
Cir. 1993) (citation omitted).  Because the district court sits 
as an appellate court in bankruptcy cases, our review of the 
district court's decision is plenary. Id.  The issue in the 
present appeal is whether the district court correctly 
interpreted and applied the legal standard of § 506(c) to the 
undisputed facts.  We therefore exercise plenary review.  In re 
C.S. Associates, 29 F.3d 903, 905 (3d Cir. 1994). 
 
 III. 
 To answer the question we posited at the outset of this 
opinion, our analysis starts with the common law that led to the 
present bankruptcy statute, 11 U.S.C. § 506(c).  We then examine 
In re McKeesport Steel Castings Co., 799 F.2d 91 (3d Cir. 1986) 
and In re C.S. Associates, 29 F.3d 903 (3d Cir. 1994), the most 
recent opinions of this Court addressing § 506(c) in any detail. 
 The general rule is that post-petition administrative 
expenses4 and the general costs of reorganization ordinarily may 
not be charged to or against secured collateral.  General 
                     
4
.   Administrative expenses include: "the actual, necessary 
costs and expenses of preserving the estate"; certain taxes, 
fines and penalties; and compensation and reimbursement for a 
limited range of services.  See 11 U.S.C.A. § 503(b) (West 1993). 
Electric Credit Corporation v. Levin & Weintraub (In re Flagstaff 
Foodservice Corp.), 739 F.2d 73, 76 (2d Cir. 1984).  Rather, such 
expenses are normally chargeable only against the unburdened 
assets of the estate, 11 U.S.C. § 503, thus preserving for 
secured creditors the collateral securing the debtor's 
obligations. 
 However, at common law the general rule was disregarded 
when a debtor, debtor in possession or trustee had expended funds 
to preserve or dispose of the very property (collateral) securing 
the debt.  See generally 3 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 506.06 
(Lawrence P. King, et al. eds., 15th ed. 1994) (tracing 
historical evolution of the rule) (hereinafter "Collier on 
Bankruptcy").  Classic examples of compensable expenditures under 
this exception include storage costs when the secured creditor's 
collateral was warehoused, or auction costs incurred on the sale 
of the creditor's collateral.  In re Myers, 24 F.2d 349, 351 (2d 
Cir. 1928) (preservation of the estate's property); Miners 
Savings Bank v. Joyce, 97 F.2d 973, 977 (3d Cir. 1938) (costs of 
sale).   
 Collier on Bankruptcy contains a detailed list of the 
types of costs and expenses that would generally be found to 
relate to the preservation or disposition of the subject property 
and benefit the holder of the security interest.  This list 
includes: appraisal fees, auctioneer fees, advertising costs, 
moving expenses, storage charges, payroll of employees directly 
and solely involved with the disposition of the subject property, 
maintenance and repair costs, and marketing costs.  Id. at 
506.56-57.   All of these expenditures share a common 
characteristic: they are expenses directly related to disposing 
of or preserving the creditor's collateral.  
 Thus, when such expenditures inured to the direct 
benefit of the secured creditor by preserving or disposing of the 
subject property, the common law permitted recovery by the 
claimant on the theory that the creditor whose collateral had 
been preserved or disposed of for the benefit of the secured 
creditor, would be unjustly enriched at the expense of the 
claimant.  Collier on Bankruptcy at 506.06.   
 In 1978, this exception was codified at section 506(c) 
of Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, which provides as follows: 
 The trustee may recover from property 
securing an allowed secured claim the 
reasonable, necessary costs and expenses of 
preserving, or disposing of, such property to 
the extent of any benefit to the holder of 
such claim. 
Congress' intent in enacting § 506(c) was to assure that when a 
claimant "expends money to provide for the reasonable and 
necessary costs and expenses of preserving or disposing of a 
secured creditor's collateral, the . . . debtor in possession is 
entitled to recover such expenses from the secured party or from 
the property securing an allowed secured claim held by such 
party."  124 Cong. Rec. 32,398 (cum. ed. Sept. 28, 1978) 
(statement of Rep. Edwards), reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code Cong. & 
Admin. News 6451.  Thus, like the equitable common law rule which 
preceded it, § 506(c) is designed to prevent a windfall to the 
secured creditor at the expense of the claimant.  IRS v. 
Boatmen's First Nat'l Bank of Kan. City, 5 F.3d 1157, 1159 (8th 
Cir. 1993).  The rule understandably shifts to the secured party, 
who has benefitted from the claimant's expenditure, the costs of 
preserving or disposing of the secured party's collateral, which 
costs might otherwise be paid from the unencumbered assets of the 
bankruptcy estate, providing that such unencumbered assets exist.  
Failing that, the costs of preserving the security for the 
secured party's benefit would otherwise fall on the warehouseman, 
auctioneer, appraiser, etc. 
 Although § 506(c) in terms refers only to recovery by 
the trustee, we, like many other courts, have held that 
administrative claimants other than trustees have standing to 
recover under § 506(c), particularly when no other party has an 
economic incentive to seek recovery on the claimant's behalf.  In 
re McKeesport Steel Castings Co., 799 F.2d 91, 93-94 (3d Cir. 
1986); accord Collier on Bankruptcy, supra, at 506-58 n.7a (while 
authorities are contradictory, the better position is to allow an 
administrative claimant to assert its claim under § 506(c)). 
 The circumstances under which a claimant may rely on 
§ 506(c) are, as we have pointed out, sharply limited.  In C.S. 
Associates we said: 
 Our decisions have clarified that to recover 
expenses under § 506(c), a claimant must 
demonstrate that (1) the expenditures are 
reasonable and necessary to the preservation 
or disposal of the property and (2) the 
expenditures provide a direct benefit to the 
secured creditors.  Equibank, 884 F.2d at 84, 
86-87; In re McKeesport Steel Castings Co., 
799 F.2d 91, 94-95 (3d Cir. 1986); see also 
In re Glasply Marine Indus., 971 F.2d 391, 
394 (9th Cir. 1992) ("[T]o satisfy the 
benefits prong [of § 506(c) the claimant] 
must establish in quantifiable terms that it 
expended funds directly to protect and 
preserve the collateral."  (internal 
quotation marks omitted)); In re Flagstaff 
Foodservice Corp., 762 F.2d 10, 12 (2d Cir. 
1985) ("[T]o warrant [§] 506(c) recovery  
 . . .  [the claimant] must show that . . . 
funds were expended primarily for the benefit 
of the creditor and that the creditor 
directly benefitted from the expenditure."). 
 
C.S. Associates, 29 F.3d at 906 (emphasis in the original).  The 
bankruptcy court and the district court concluded that 
Precision's sales of raw material to Visual did not operate 
directly to preserve or dispose of Fremont's collateral and hence 
Precision had not demonstrated a direct benefit to Fremont, as it 
is required to do under C.S. Associates.  Dist. Ct. Op. 10-11. 
 Precision nevertheless contends that as a supplier of 
raw materials it helped "preserve" Visual as a going concern, and 
that by continuing in operation Visual was enabled to pay back a 
substantial portion of its debts to Fremont.  Therefore, claims 
Precision, Fremont benefitted from Precision's post-petition 
dealings with Visual.  As a result, Precision argues, Fremont's 
collateral is chargeable by Precision under § 506(c).  We cannot 
agree.  We do not interpret § 506(c) or understand our precedents 
interpreting § 506(c) to protect ordinary trade creditors such as 
Precision. 
 Nor is our analysis altered by Precision's argument 
that it helped maintain Visual as a "going concern."  Precision 
voluntarily continued to deal with Visual, presumably with the 
hope of turning a profit.  There is no reason to believe that 
Congress intended to afford the same special protection for trade 
creditors who furnish materials to a Chapter 11 debtor as it did 
for claimants who preserve or dispose of secured assets.  The 
benefit provided by Precision's supply of raw materials was not 
directed towards preserving or disposing of Fremont's cash 
collateral.  Accordingly, Precision's reliance on § 506(c) is 
misplaced.  
 
 IV. 
 Precision, in petitioning for payment from Fremont's 
cash collateral, relies on In Re McKeesport Steel Castings Co., 
799 F.2d 91 (3d Cir. 1986).  McKeesport upheld a claim by a 
utility, Equitable Gas, which had supplied natural gas to the 
debtor manufacturer, McKeesport, while McKeesport was undergoing 
Chapter 11 reorganization.  McKeesport's largest creditor, 
Equibank, whose loans were secured by liens on McKeesport's 
inventory, accounts receivable, real property, fixtures and 
equipment, challenged the payment to Equitable Gas for its post-
petition gas service.   
 Relying on three different theories, one of which 
contended that Equitable Gas had preserved the lienholder's 
collateral under § 506(c), the utility sought to charge the 
collateral securing Equibank's interest for unpaid post-petition 
utility bills.  Equitable Gas also relied on its superpriority 
status granted by a consent order entered by the bankruptcy 
court,5 and on 11 U.S.C. § 366(b), which provides that a utility 
may discontinue services if it is not furnished "adequate 
assurance" of payment.6 
   The bankruptcy court had authorized, by order, 
payment out of Equibank's cash collateral for Equitable Gas's 
post-petition gas services.  However, despite a payment time 
table set by the bankruptcy court, McKeesport regularly failed to 
meet its obligations to Equitable Gas. 
 On two different occasions, Equitable Gas had attempted 
to discontinue its gas services after McKeesport failed to make 
timely payments.  Each time, the bankruptcy court entered orders 
denying Equitable Gas the right to discontinue service, stating 
that by ordering the continued supply of gas it was seeking to 
protect the lienholders.  On Equitable Gas's third application, 
however, the bankruptcy court granted its petition for relief and 
ordered the secured creditors to pay $57,261.16 for post-petition 
gas service.  The district court denied recovery to Equitable 
Gas, but we reversed the district court's order and affirmed the 
order of the bankruptcy court.   
                     
5
.   The Bankruptcy Court by order had permitted McKeesport to 
use its cash collateral to pay for raw materials, supplies, gas, 
etc.  It had also granted a superpriority to those who provided 
raw materials, utilities and supplies used in McKeesport's 
manufacturing process. 
6
.   11 U.S.C. § 366 forbids a utility to discontinue service 
solely on the basis of the commencement of Chapter 11 
proceedings, provided it is furnished with adequate assurance of 
payment in the form of a deposit or other security. 
 We acknowledge that in ordering payment to Equitable 
Gas for providing post-petition gas service, the McKeesport court 
stated that it was doing so "to preserve the going concern value 
of the debtor's estate."  799 F.2d at 95.  This would appear to 
lend support to Precision's argument.  However, the difference 
between the circumstances of McKeesport and the circumstance 
which we face is dramatic.  This difference was recognized as 
well by the bankruptcy court and by the district court.   
 As we have just recounted, in McKeesport, the 
bankruptcy court had entered two orders denying Equitable Gas the 
right to discontinue service.  As a result, Equitable Gas, unlike 
Precision, had no choice as to whether to supply its product to 
the debtor in possession.  Equitable Gas had been directed by the 
bankruptcy court to continue to provide post-petition gas 
service. 
 Moreover, Equitable Gas had still another string to its 
bow, which Precision does not.  While the McKeesport court had no 
need to rule or rely on Equitable Gas's claim under § 366(b), we 
cannot ignore the obvious fact that under § 366(b), Equitable Gas 
was, as a utility, entitled to "adequate assurance" of payment, 
an assurance not given to Precision.  
 We do not question that the court's discussion in 
McKeesport may have inadvertently encouraged trade creditors such 
as Precision to believe that any materials furnished to a debtor 
which assisted a debtor's operations -- materials such as raw 
materials, typewriters, paper clips, pencils, and the like -- 
constituted a benefit to the debtor and thus could be charged 
against a secured lender's collateral.  However, we do not read 
McKeesport as generously as Precision does.  We believe that the 
bankruptcy court order obtained by Equitable Gas, the cash 
collateral order providing for payment to utilities and the 
presence of § 366 issues all distinguish McKeesport from the 
situation in which Precision has found itself.   
 Merely providing some benefit to the debtor, as 
Precision has provided by supplying Visual with steel, does not 
satisfy § 506(c)'s requirement that the claimant in order to 
prevail must provide a direct benefit inuring to the secured 
lender for the preservation or disposition of the secured 
property.  Were it otherwise, no secured lender would assist in 
financing the debtor, because then every trade creditor would in 
effect have priority over the secured lender.  As the bankruptcy 
court emphasized, the availability of Chapter 11 financing would 
be jeopardized if we were to allow any claimant who furnishes any 
benefit to a secured creditor to claim under § 506(c).  The Court 
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has also recognized that 
§ 506(c) cannot readily be looked to by trade creditors who 
supply materials to a debtor in Chapter 11, observing that: 
   In a reorganization, it is essential that the 
debtor keep his post-bankruptcy accounts 
paid, so that tradesmen will have an 
incentive to deal with the company in Chapter 
11.  If this goal is not reached, in many 
cases Chapter 11 debtors will find it 
increasingly difficult to maintain operations 
and to reorganize as going concerns, and the 
purpose of Chapter 11 would be seriously 
undermined.  It is equally clear, however, 
that § 506(c) was not intended as a panacea 
for this problem.   
Matter of P.C., Ltd., 929 F.2d 203, 206 (5th Cir. 1991).   
 We conclude that McKeesport neither governs nor 
conflicts with the disposition of this case. 
 
 V. 
 Our most recent instruction respecting § 506(c) appears 
in C.S. Associates, supra, a decision which followed McKeesport 
by some eight years and to which we have referred earlier in this 
opinion.  See supra, pp. 9-10.  In that case we rejected a claim 
by a municipality seeking post-petition real estate taxes and 
water and sewage rents to charge the proceeds of sale of a 
building under § 506(c).  Although the claimant municipality 
argued that it had "benefitted" the secured party through general 
municipal services, we held that this "benefit" could not support 
a claim under § 506(c).  Section 506(c) was "designed to extract 
from a particular asset the cost of preserving or disposing of 
that asset."  29 F.3d at 907 (quoting In re Parr Meadows Racing 
Ass'n, 92 B.R. 30, 35 (E.D.N.Y.1988), aff'd in part, rev'd in 
part on other grounds, 880 F.2d 1540 (2d Cir. 1989)).   
 Because the city had not demonstrated that the services 
"actually were performed for the direct benefit of the [secured] 
property," id. at 908, we denied relief, making clear that 
expenses incurred by another can be charged against the property 
securing a secured lender's loan only where, and only to the 
extent that, the lender has been directly benefitted by the 
preservation or disposition of property serving as collateral.   
 
 VI. 
 Because Precision had not been specifically ordered by 
the bankruptcy court to provide steel to Visual, and because 
Precision has not met the test of § 506(c) mandated by C.S. 
Associates, we will affirm the district court's order of 
September 26, 1994, which had denied relief to Precision for the 
same reasons as had the bankruptcy court. 
